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Chapter pages in book: (p. 45 - 46)view of its supposedly arbitrary powers. When it finally dawned on the
Germans that the industrial base was too narrow, there was no longer
time to broaden it; to do sO would have taken manpower arid steel from
immediate output and worsened the shortages. The Nazis did not, there-
fore, draw upon all their reserves, at least not until late 1944: at first
because it seemed unnecessary in view of their successes in the field and
apparent abundance of foreign labor; subsequently because it was ob-
viously too late. It is tempting to conclude that countries do not exert
more effort in war than they have to, that the Germans were in the end
partly undone by their early conquests and the resulting trainloads of
prisoners and booty.4'
6INCREASE IN HOURS DURING WORLD WAR II: UNITED STATES
Gains from a longer workweek are estimated by deducting employment
measured in persons from employment measured in equivalent fuiltime
workers (Table 9). These accretions reached a maximum in 1943 of
7.6 million equivalent workers (line 14), then declined to 5.5 million
in 1945. Why were some of the gains that had been made du.ring 1940-
43 lost during 1944-45?
The answer may be found by separating parttime from overtime work.
Little was gained or lost during 1940-43 as a result of changes in the
extent of parttime employment but during 1944-45 the time lost rose
(Table 10), apparently in some degree because young people and
women had become a larger element in the civilian labor force and men
a smaller element. Many young people could work only after school
and on Saturdays. Some women, burdened by children and home duties,
could spare no more than a few days a week; and women always take
more time off for ill health than men. Finally, keen demand for labor
is usually accompanied by higher absenteeism and turnover. The gains
41Germanyused foreign labor not only directly but also indirectly: it confiscated com-
modities or bought them at low prices; an eighth.of its pig iron and about 5 percent
of its machine tools came from occupied Poland, France, Belgium, and the Nether-
lands; early it captured stocks of oil, copper, and other strategic materials. During
1939-44 foreign contributions to national product ranged from 16 to 25 percent
(StrategicBombing Survey,pp. 21, 22, 260). These imports, even though all were
not costless, unquestionably took the place of some native labor. Nevertheless, its
plunder was not enough to meet its war needs and, though it faced desperate labor
scarcities from 1942 on, it was unable or unwilling to call on its substantial reserves
among its own nationals.
45Table 9
Wartime Gain in Equivalent Fulitime Employment due to Increase in Hours
(parttime and overtime combined): United States, April 1940-1946
1940194119421943194419451946
AGRICULTURE
1 Av. weekly hours 54.055.056.760.056.153.552.6
2 Employed persons
(millions) 8.7 8.9 9.1 8.8 8.4 8.7 8.2
3 Manhours (millions) 470490 516528 471 465 431
4 Equivalent fuiltime em-





6 Av, weekly hours 40.041.543.546.546.145.642.9
7 Employed persons
(millions) 37.339.643.Z45.045.344.945.9
8 Manhours (millions) 1492164319012093208820471969













GAIN IN EMPLOYMENT DUE TO ROURS INCREASES
14 Compared with 1940
(millions) +1.4+3.8+7.6+6.5+5.5+2.5
15 Compared with 1941
(millions) +2.4+6.2+5.1+4.1+1.1
Source of data on which the calculations were based: Bureau of Census, Current
Population Surveys. Fulltime hours were assumed to be 53 a week in agriculture, 42
a week in nonagriculture.
due to overtime (Table 11, line 4) rose rapidly during 1940-43, slightly
in 1944, and fell off somewhat by 1945, though they were offset in
some degree during 1944 and 1945 by the time lost through continued
dilutions of the labor force with women and young people.
7DEMOBILIZATION
Between mid- 1944 and 1945, Canada's armed forces discharged a fifth
of their personnel. Its labor force failed to keep pace with population
46